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The Return Motivations of Legal Permanent Migrants: Evidence 
from Exchange Rate Shocks and Immigrants in Australia 
By PAOLO ABARCAR* 
THIS DRAFT: FEBRUARY 23, 2015 
Why do legal permanent migrants return to their home countries? 
This paper uses exogenous exchange rate shocks arising from the 
1997 Asian Financial Crisis to distinguish return motivations of 
Australian immigrants. A 10% favorable shock (a depreciation in 
home country currency) leads to a 0.37 percentage point reduced 
likelihood of return. The effect is stronger for those with pre-
existing intentions to return, weaker for those undecided, and zero 
for those who initially desired to stay. The results favor a life-cycle 
explanation for migrant behavior and reject the theory that 
migrants are target earners who seek to invest upon return. (JEL: 
O15, F22, J15, J61) 
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Many individuals who live and work outside their countries of birth 
eventually return home. While official government statistics are often lacking, 
indirect estimates from different countries over time suggest considerable flows: 
Jasso and Rosenzweig (1982) for example suggest that more than 20 percent of 
immigrants chose to re-migrate from the US in the 1970s. Dustmann and Weiss 
(2007) approximate that 40% of all male immigrants and 55% of female 
immigrants left the UK after five years of arriving in the 1990s. Most recently, 
Gibson and McKenzie (2011) find that over a quarter of the “best and brightest” 
students who ever migrated from three Pacific countries ultimately ended up 
returning (33% in Tonga, 27% in Papua New Guinea, and 26% in New Zealand). 
That migrants voluntarily choose to return in seemingly substantial numbers 
poses a puzzle. People move to where they earn the most, at least according to 
traditional economic theory (Sjaastad 1962; Harris and Todaro 1970). Hence, 
most return should occur when earnings in places of origin surpass those at the 
destination. Yet earnings in migrant-sending countries rarely overtake receiving 
countries’. There should be little or no return. Reality appears to defy this simple 
prediction.  
More nuanced theories go beyond income maximization and appeal to the 
inclination of migrants to invest or consume in their home countries. Such 
theories allow for marginal changes in home country conditions to matter for 
migrant behavior, without wage level reversals. Two competing models are at the 
forefront: those that see migrants as target earners or life-cycle agents. As a target 
earner, a migrant is credit constrained, so she works abroad until she accumulates 
a sufficient level of savings to finance an enterprise upon returning home (as in 
Piore 1979 and Mesnard 2004). The primary motive is investment. As a life-cycle 
agent, a migrant weighs the marginal benefits of obtaining higher income in the 
host country versus the marginal costs of remaining overseas, since home country 
consumption is preferred (see for instance Stark, Helmenstein, and Yegorov 1997 
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or Dustmann 2003). The goal is to consume. The two have separate predictions on 
how migrants respond to home country factors. For example, a target earner is 
thought to cut her stay abroad shorter when her purchasing power for the home 
country increases while a life-cycle migrant makes her stay longer1.  
The empirical investigation for reasons of migrant return related to home 
country considerations is scant and limited to particular contexts. Governments 
seldom record the flow of migrants, let alone track their locations over time. 
Another impediment is the difficulty of isolating exogenous variation in factors 
that affect return, limiting the ability for causal inference. Most studies focus on 
correlations. Constant and Massey (2002), for example, relate covariates of social 
and economic attachments in the home country with migrant return and find that 
these are strongly associated for a sample of German guest workers. Kirdar 
(2013) demonstrates that German immigrants shorten their stays overseas when 
purchasing power increases for their home country. A chief concern with these 
studies, however, lies with omitted variable bias, as source country factors are 
possibly endogenous to variables that are unobserved. That migrants with more 
social attachments at home are more likely to return need not imply a causal 
relationship. The group may simply possess other unmeasured characteristics 
related to social attachments that make return appealing. 
Yang (2006) perhaps comes closest to identifying the causal impact of 
changing home country conditions on return. To confront endogeneity, the author 
utilizes an unexpected event, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, when substantial 
and varied exchange rate shocks were realized between the Philippine peso and 
foreign currencies. Filipino migrants work in a diverse set of countries abroad so 
it was as if each of them were randomly allocated different exchange rate shocks 
during this period. By comparing the behavior of Filipino migrants who attained 
 
1
 This is true if the substitution effect dominates the income effects, as I show in the theory section. 
2
 A standard deviation change in the exchange rate during this period is 29%. 
3
 Perhaps because they do not have appetite for self-employment or simply do not have access to business ideas. 
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greater and smaller shocks, the paper establishes the causal impact of changing 
exchange rates on the decision of migrants to return home. Filipino migrants 
appear to be driven by life-cycle considerations. They prolong their stay abroad 
when they experience favorable changes to their purchasing power at home. 
This paper focuses on Australian permanent immigrants and their motivations 
for return. I employ a strategy similar to Yang (2006) in using exchange rate 
shocks brought about by the Asian Financial Crisis, except I look at a mirror 
image: data from a destination country on immigrants from multiple origin 
countries. Doing so provides several advantages that complement previous 
research: First, because the source of variation is in places of origin rather than 
destination, I distinguish between the effects of exchange rate shocks from other 
home country shocks, such as changes in GDP and unemployment, that may also 
influence return. Second, I capture households whose members have all migrated 
and would have otherwise been absent in data collected from the home country, a 
limitation of Yang (2006). Third, Yang (2006) primarily focuses on Filipino 
migrants on temporary work contracts abroad. It is unclear whether his results 
must hold for other types of migrants as well, such as those granted permission 
for indefinite stay at the destination. For this set of individuals, a reasonable prior 
in fact is that there could be no motivation for return at all. I am able to test this 
hypothesis. 
Australia is a natural setting to study migration because of its large immigrant 
community; 24.7% of its population is foreign-born. Most immigrants are legal 
permanent residents (as opposed to undocumented), whose immediate relatives 
are already present in the host country. 
My main contribution is the finding that a 10% home country currency 
depreciation leads to a 0.37 percentage point reduction in the probability that a 
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migrant returns2. The 2-year permanent return rate in the period is 4.1%, so the 
effect is equivalent to almost 10% of the return rate. The result is robust and 
consistent with the story that migrants return because of life-cycle considerations. 
The effect is strongest for migrants who have pre-determined they want to return, 
weak for those initially undecided, and null for those who originally stated their 
desire to stay. This is evidence that migrants seek to optimally time their return, 
rather than decide whether or not to return, based on favorable conditions. 
Moreover, I show evidence that the effect of the exchange rate shocks is not 
merely a proxy for the influence of other macroeconomic conditions such as GDP 
per capita growth or the change in unemployment in the home country. Evidence 
suggests that return is more a function of purchasing power and consumption 
rather than employment possibilities in the origin country. 
I. Theoretical Framework 
What can responses to exchange rate shocks reveal about the motivations of 
migrants to return? I present here the life cycle and target earnings models, 
patterned after the models presented in Dustmann (2003) and Mesnard (2004). I 
highlight the role played by exchange rates in influencing migrant behavior.  
Consider a migrant, who currently resides in a foreign country (Australia in 
this case) at time 0 and whose lifespan extends until time 1. For simplicity, 
assume that there is no discounting between periods, the interest rate equals zero, 
and perfect foresight is possible. Hence, given preferences for foreign and home 
consumption, 𝑢!(𝑐!) and 𝑢!(𝑐!), a migrant maximizes her lifetime utility by 
concurrently choosing the amount of consumption in the foreign country 𝑐!, 
consumption at home 𝑐!, and duration of stay abroad 𝑡, where 0 < 𝑡 ≤ 1. Assume 
 
2
 A standard deviation change in the exchange rate during this period is 29%. 
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prices to be normalized to 1 in both countries. Further, assume that the migrant 
favors consumption at home to consumption abroad. 
There exist two types of migrants: lifecycle consumers, who are only capable 
of being wage earners at home3, and target earners, whose goal abroad is to 
accumulate resources in order to invest in a small business at home. The wage 
abroad for both types is 𝑤!. An exchange rate 𝐸 converts Australian currency to 
home country currency.  
Upon return, a lifecycle migrant works for a wage 𝑤!. A target earner, on the 
other hand, invests in a business that provides a high-income stream of 𝑦 where 𝑦 > 𝐸𝑤! > 𝑤!. Assume in this case that self-employment cannot be done 
simultaneously with working for a wage. In addition, starting a business requires 
collateral, 𝐶, which can only be financed through savings abroad. Credit 
constraints bind. 
This difference between life-cycle consumers and target earners allows for 
deriving conditions such that the two are distinguishable from their responses to 
exchange rate shocks to their home country currencies. 
A. Lifecycle Consumers 
The maximization problem for a lifecycle consumer is as follows: 
 max!!,!!,!   𝑡𝑢!(𝑐!)+ 1− 𝑡 𝑢!(𝑐!) such that 
(1) 𝑡𝑐! + 𝑆! ≤ 𝑡𝑤! 
(2) 1− 𝑡 𝑐! ≤ 1− 𝑡 𝑤! + 𝐸𝑆! 
 
 
3
 Perhaps because they do not have appetite for self-employment or simply do not have access to business ideas. 
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where (1) and (2) are the budget constraints for the period spent abroad (𝑡)  and at 
home 1− 𝑡 . 𝑆!  represents accumulated savings up to time 𝑡. Considering for the 
moment only interior solutions, then (1) and (2) are satisfied with equality and (2) 
can be substituted into (1) for 𝑆!. 
The first order condition of the corresponding Lagrangian with respect to 𝑡 is 
given by (3) where 𝜆 is the marginal utility of wealth: 
(3) 𝑢! 𝑐! − 𝑢! 𝑐! + 𝜆 𝐸𝑤! − 𝑤! + 𝑐! − 𝐸𝑐! = 0         
 
The result is fairly intuitive. With a preference to consume at home, the life-cycle 
migrant balances the marginal cost of remaining abroad 𝑢! 𝑐! − 𝑢! 𝑐!  with the 
marginal benefit of earning higher abroad represented by the term 𝜆(𝐸𝑤! − 𝑤! +𝑐! − 𝐸𝑐!). 
The optimal duration of stay abroad 𝑡∗ evolves in response to a shock in 𝐸. 
Equation (4) describes the response 
(4)  !"!" = !!"(!!!!!)!!   +   !"(!!!!!!!!!!!" )!!  
 
where (𝑤! − 𝑐!) ≥ 0 and !!!!" < 0 because of a first order condition, 𝑏 = 𝐸𝑡 !!!!" +1− 𝑡 !!!!" , and 𝑎 = − 𝐸𝑤! − 𝑤! + 𝑐! − 𝐸𝑐! . The details of the comparative 
statics exercise are in the Appendix but the proof is similar to Mesnard (2004). 
Since the marginal utility of wealth is positive and it can be shown that 𝑏 < 0 and 𝑎 ≤ 0, the response to a favorable (positive) change to the exchange rate depends 
on two effects. First, a substitution effect, 
!!"(!!!!!)!! > 0, induces the migrant to 
stay longer abroad; the shock provides an incentive to accumulate more resources 
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abroad. But an opposing income effect, 
!"(!!!!!!!𝜕𝑐𝑓𝜕𝐸 )!! < 0, encourages the migrant 
to cut her stay abroad short because of the higher spending power permitted at 
home by an increase in E. While the sign of the total effect is ambiguous, the 
overall result, if the substitution effect turns out to dominate the income effect, is 
that migrants prolong their stay in the foreign country because of a favorable 
exchange rate shock. The prediction allows the identification of a life-cycle 
consumer because, as I show in the next part, a target earner does not quite 
respond to an exchange rate shock in the same way. 
B. Target Earners 
The corresponding optimization problem for a target earner is as follows: 
 max!!,!!,!   𝑡𝑢!(𝑐!)+ 1− 𝑡 𝑢!(𝑐!) such that 
(5) 𝑡𝑐! + 𝑆! ≤ 𝑡𝑤! 
(6) 1− 𝑡 𝑐! ≤ 1− 𝑡 𝑦 + 𝐸𝑆! − 𝐶 
(7) 𝐸𝑆! ≥ 𝐶   
 
Consider here once again only interior solutions such that (5), (6), and (7), are 
satisfied with equality. In particular, note that at the optimum, 𝐸𝑆! = 𝐶. A 
migrant stays abroad only up to the point where her target savings are met. This 
makes sense: there is otherwise no point delaying return until 𝐸𝑆! > 𝐶 since 
investment at home fetches greater per period income 𝑦 than 𝑤!  when 
consumption at home is preferred. But consider also the other possibility that the 
collateral C needed to start up a business is so high that it cannot be financed by 
accumulated savings even when the migrant stays abroad until the end of his life 
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(𝑤! < 𝐶). Here, the migrant will simply revert to acting like a lifecycle consumer 
and solves the corresponding optimization problem. 
The solution is straightforward and the details are left to the appendix. The 
first order condition that describes the optimal choice of 𝑡 is given by (8). 
(8)  𝑢!! 𝑤! − !!" !!" + 𝑢! 𝑤! − !!" − 𝑢! 𝑦 = 0 
 
Consequently, the change in 𝑡∗ that results from a change in the exchange rate 
amounts to 
(9)  
!"!" = − !! 
 
This is always negative. Hence, for target earners, a favorable exchange rate 
shock leads to an unambiguous shorter stay abroad. 
To summarize, if the motivation of a migrant for return is mostly to invest, 
then her expected response to a favorable exchange rate shock is to shorten her 
stay abroad. Observing otherwise allows us to reject the target earnings model in 
favor of one where the migrant is dominated by life-cycle considerations and the 
concern is primarily to consume. In such a model, a migrant lengthens her stay 
abroad at the onset of a favorable exchange rate shock if the substitution effect 
dominates the income effect. But it is of course equally plausible that the return 
decisions of migrants do not at all respond to exchange rate shocks, in which case 
migrants may not actually prefer consumption at home (a starting assumption) or 
that the solution to the above models are at the corner and 𝑡∗ = 1.  
These observations inform the interpretation of the results that will come from 
the empirical section. I provide evidence that legal permanent migrants in 
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Australia are likely to be life-cycle consumers and do in fact respond to home 
country considerations. 
II. The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 and its Impact on Australia 
While few observers had hinted at the possibility of a crash4, the crisis that 
eventually beset the booming East and Southeast Asian economies of the 1990s is 
largely regarded to have been unexpected. Telltale signs were, at least, absent: 
savings rates were high, inflation was low, and fiscal accounts were balanced 
(Radelet and Sachs 1998). Credit agencies such as Standard and Poor’s and 
Moody’s provided no indication of changing risk in country ratings until after the 
crisis had begun. 
The Asian Financial Crisis that hit is credited to have officially started in July 
1997 with the devaluation of the Thai baht. The event triggered a wave of capital 
flight from the region as foreign investors withdrew funds, speculating on the 
weakness of surrounding economies. Five countries were most affected: Thailand, 
Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines. In the year before the 
crisis, inflows of foreign capital into these countries amounted to $97.1 billion. In 
just a year after, outflows were estimated to be $18.1 billion (Radelet and Sachs 
1999). Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and Laos suffered considerable economic 
losses as well, albeit to a lesser degree. Currency devaluations followed. What 
economic analysts had previously dubbed the “Asian Economic Miracle” had 
come to an end. 
For the most part, Australia came out unscathed. Diminished regional demand 
for its exports was a brief concern, but while exports did subsequently decline 
(Gunawardana 2006), the impact on the local economy was negligible. Real GDP 
 
4
 See, for instance, Park (1996) who warned about the excessive influx of foreign capital into East Asia. He suggested 
that it was both speculative and short term and that some controls might be necessary to discourage capital movements. 
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continued to grow by 4.0% during 1997-98, up from 2.8% in the previous period; 
unemployment fell from 8.7% to 8.3%; and private consumption and business 
investment actually rose by 4.6% and 11.6% from the previous year.5 Makin 
(1999) attributes the resilience to the switching of international capital out of 
Asian markets into Australasian and other markets. The flows kept interest rates 
low and asset values high in advanced economies. 
The Asian Financial Crisis makes for a compelling natural experiment. That 
Australia was relatively unaffected holds constant the local economic conditions 
faced by immigrants in the country. But since these migrants come from a variety 
of backgrounds, each effectively experienced different home country shocks from 
the crisis. Thus, an approach to understand what motivates return is to observe 
which migrants were more likely to come back, by comparing the behavior of 
those faced with different shocks. Most notable among shocks were exchange rate 
changes that occurred between home country currencies and the Australian dollar. 
Migrants had their home country currencies appreciate or depreciate to varying 
degrees in a way that was unexpected and plausibly random. 
Figure 1 depicts the exchange rates during the time of the Asian Financial 
Crisis between the Australian dollar and foreign currencies of the top 15 home 
countries of migrants in the data. The exchange rates are expressed in foreign 
currency over Australian dollar (e.g. PHP/AUD) and are normalized to 1 in 
January 1996 for ease of comparison. An increase represents foreign currency 
depreciation with respect to the Australian dollar, and signifies a higher 
purchasing power for the migrant looking to come home. A structural break in 
trends occurs around July 1997, the start of the crisis. Variation around this period 
is what the study exploits. 
 
5 
Queensland Treasury and Trade. Annual Economic Report, 1997-1998 
http://www.qgso.qld.gov.au/products/reports/annual-econ-report/annual-econ-report-1997-98.pdf (accessed June 21, 2013)
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[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
III. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
I employ data from the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Australia 
(LSIA1), a nationally representative study of principal immigrant applicants 
issued permanent visas offshore and arrived in Australia between 1993 and 
1995.67 The survey was conducted in three waves of interviews and I focus on the 
2nd and 3rd waves, which were implemented from 1995-1997 and 1997-1999 
respectively. This nicely corresponds to years prior to and after the Asian 
Financial Crisis. The main sample thus consists of 3069 principal immigrants 
aged 15 to 60 years old who have identifiable countries of birth and historical 
exchange rate data available for their origin countries. 
As part of its migration program, the Australian government allocates 
permanent visas under five broad categories: the Preferential Family, 
Concessional Family, Business Skills and Employer Nomination Scheme, 
Independent, and Humanitarian. The labor market has always played a crucial 
role in this structure. Applicants under the independent and concessional family 
streams are subject to a points test, where they are allocated points by satisfying 
criteria deemed in demand by the labor market (such as age, education, 
experience, English language ability, etc.). Visa eligibility is determined by 
passing a predetermined threshold of points. Employment Nomination is reserved 
for firms sponsoring workers. On the other hand, Business Skills are granted for 
entrepreneurs who have invested a certain amount of capital in the country. The 
Preferential Family and Humanitarian visa streams are the only categories that do 
not depend on economic circumstances. The former is reserved for close relatives 
 
6
 The source of the data is the Department of Immigration and Citizenship of the Australian Government.  
http://www.immi.gov.au/media/research/lsia/lsia01.htm#x1. 
7
 The survey excludes New Zealanders who comprise majority of immigrant inflows to Australia. 
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of Australian citizens or permanent residents while the latter are for refugees and 
their family members. The number of visas issued per year is capped. For 1993-
1994, the total number granted for all streams was 76,870 (Phillips, Klapdor, and 
Simon-Davies 2010). 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
Table 1 describes the resulting composition of immigrants in the main sample. 
Those that come are typically young (aged 33), married, and well educated (42% 
have at least a bachelor’s degree). Australian immigrants obtained legal residence 
most commonly through family sponsorship, and they arrive initially with a 
significant amount of funds (over 25,000 AUD on average). Majority of principal 
applicants declare typical household members to be present with them in 
Australia by 1995-1997. 60% of households do not have members remaining in 
their home countries. The number increases to 71% if one only considers close 
relatives (spouse, son, or daughter). Only 19% sent money to relatives or friends 
overseas in the course of the past 2 years. 
Immigrants to Australia come from a diverse set of countries. Table 2 presents 
a tabulation of individuals from the top 15 source countries in the sample. 
England is the primary source with 281 individuals, but countries are fairly evenly 
represented. Asian countries most affected by the 1997 crisis (Indonesia, South 
Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines) take up a considerable share. 
The analysis assigns migrants exchange rate shocks by calculating the change 
in their home country exchange rate that occurred in the period between their 
wave 2 and wave 3 interviews.8 I follow Yang (2006) in using nominal instead of 
 
8
 Specifically, I compute the average exchange rate a year prior to a migrant’s interview date in wave 2 and 
correspondingly for wave 3 then calculate the percentage change between periods by subtracting log values of the former 
from the latter. Alternatively, computing exchange rate shocks by simply calculating the change in the exchange rates 
between waves 2 and 3 at the exact day the migrants were interviewed does not change the results of the analysis. For 
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real exchange rates since data on the former are available at a daily frequency, 
allowing for the exchange rate changes to be calculated exactly prior to and after 
interview dates. Daily historical exchange rates were obtained online from Oanda 
Corporation.9 The exchange rates are expressed in home country currency over 
Australian dollars such that an increase represents a depreciation of the home 
currency while a decrease signifies an appreciation with respect to the Australian 
dollar. Increases in the exchange rate can be thought of as favorable to immigrants 
since it raises the foreign currency value of earnings when utilized for home 
country consumption. 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
How were country currencies of migrants affected by the Asian financial 
crisis? The last column of Table 2 calculates mean exchange rate shocks 
experienced by individuals from origin countries going from wave 2 to 3 of the 
survey. On average, country currencies depreciated by 10% with respect to the 
Australian dollar, but the shocks were varied. A number of countries saw their 
currencies appreciate. Some even experienced extreme changes: with Bulgaria’s 
currency depreciating by 310%, Turkey by 112%, and Romania by 98%. I 
continue to include migrants from all these countries in the analysis for lack of 
any objective rule to exclude them, but I conduct robustness checks to show that 
the results do not rely on their presence. 
The outcome variable of interest is return migration captured by an attrition 
indicator, described in Table 3. Enumerators noted the reason a respondent could 
not be interviewed in a particular wave. If the respondent was found absent, they 
asked a friend or relative most likely to know about the respondent’s 
                                                                                                                                
migrants who were not interviewed in wave 3 and were therefore not assigned an interview date, I assume a most likely 
interview date. This is taken from the interview group they belonged to and I use the mean interview date of that group. 
9
 http://www.oanda.com/currency/historical-rates/ (accessed March 2013) 
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whereabouts. I use “Overseas Permanently” as the indicator for return, assuming 
that this accurately reflects return migration. It is distinct presumably from 
“Overseas Temporarily” which describes visits home or trips to other countries. 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
Measuring return migration in this manner makes the analysis susceptible to 
measurement error. For instance, “Overseas Permanently” could mean that the 
migrant moved to another country overseas instead of back to the home country. I 
discuss later the implications of such threats and present robustness checks to 
verify that results are insensitive to relaxing measurement error assumptions. 
IV. Empirical Results 
The main equation I estimate is as follows: 
(10)  𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁!" = 𝛼 + 𝛽!Δ𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸!" + 𝛽!Δ𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑆!" + 𝛽!𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅!" + 𝜀!" 
 
where 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁!" is a dummy indicating whether migrant i from country c 
returned between waves 2 and 3 and Δ𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸!" is the percentage change in 
home country exchange rate between interviews.  𝛽! is the coefficient of interest, 
indicating the effect of a 1% increase in exchange rates on the probability of 
return. Since the number of years between interviews varied per migrant, I 
account for this by including Δ𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑆!", although this is typically two for most. 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅!" are year dummies which indicate when the interview for wave 2 was 
conducted for migrant i. This is either 1995, 1996, or 1997 and allows for time 
trends in migrant return. 𝜀!" is the disturbance term which is assumed to be 
uncorrelated with Δ𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸!". I cluster standard errors at the country level to 
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allow 𝜀!" to be correlated between individuals interviewed at the same time who 
are from the same origin country. 
Potential omitted variables might still be a worry in this specification. In 
particular, certain migrant households might just happen to have been differently 
impacted by the Asian Financial crisis in a way that is correlated with both their 
exchange rate shock and return. This is a violation of the exogeneity assumption 
and biases the estimate of 𝛽!. Hence, I estimate an augmented equation (11) that 
includes, 𝑿𝒊𝒄, a vector of controls for migrant and household characteristics 
recorded pre-crisis for each individual (refer to Panel A and B of Table 1 again 
for the list of covariates). I also include country of origin variables that 
incorporate information on common language and colonial history with Australia, 
distance from Sydney, GDP per capita, and indicators for whether the country is 
included in the list of those hardest hit by the Asian financial crisis.10 
(11)  𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁!" = 𝛼 + 𝛽!Δ𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸!" + 𝛽!Δ𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑆!" + 𝛽!𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅!" + 𝜷𝟓𝑿𝒊𝒄 + 𝜀!" 
 
If Δ𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸!" is indeed exogenous, then the estimate of 𝛽! should be unaltered 
by the addition of controls. To the extent that these controls also help explain 
return migration, their inclusion should make estimates of 𝛽!  more precise. 
A. Main Result 
Table 4 produces estimates of 𝛽! using OLS. The 1st column begins with a 
specification that excludes control variables but I progressively introduce a set of 
country of origin, household, and migrant characteristics as covariates. The 
 
10 
Data on common language, colonial history, and distance are taken from the GeoDist database at CEPII, 
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm (accessed on July 5, 2013). GDP per capita data are from the World 
Development Indicators of the World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators 
(accessed on July 5, 2013). 
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exchange rate shocks are negatively related to the probability of return. When 
Column 2 includes the log of GDP per capita of the migrant’s origin country as a 
control, the estimated impact diminishes but remains negative and statistically 
significant. It turns out that log of GDP per capita is an important control variable 
since migrants from richer countries are more likely to return but also happen to 
experience more negative exchange rate shocks (an appreciation in their 
currencies) than poorer countries during the financial crisis.11 Accounting for this, 
however, does not completely overturn the result. The negative estimate remains 
robust to including a host of additional controls on country of origin, household, 
and migrant characteristics in columns 3, 4, and 5. There is no evidence that 
certain types of individuals or households were impacted differentially by the 
financial crisis in Australia in a way that is correlated with their experienced 
exchange rate shocks. 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
A 10% increase in the exchange rate leads to a 0.37 percentage point decline 
in the probability that a migrant returns. This is not trivial, provided that a 
standard deviation change in the exchange rate during the period was 0.29, while 
the permanent return rate was 4.1%. The effect accounts for almost 10% of the 
return rate. Legal permanent migrants remain sensitive to home country 
conditions. As the value of their foreign wages and savings increase with respect 
to home country currencies, they stay longer at the destination. Hence, life-cycle 
considerations appear to dominate target-earning motives. Yang (2006) finds the 
same for his sample of overseas Filipino migrants, mostly temporary contract 
workers abroad with family members remaining behind. That this effect generally 
holds for a sample of migrants in Australia is a new finding. These individuals 
 
11
 The correlation between ΔlnERATE and ln(GDP per capita) is -0.18. 
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have permanent residence status and hold the option to stay, but they appear to 
remain influenced by home country considerations. 
B. Differential Effects by Intention to Return 
Next, I investigate whether the effect of the exchange rate shocks varies 
depending on the subgroup considered. LSIA1 asked individuals at baseline, prior 
to the crisis, whether they intend to return to their home countries sometime in the 
future. Possible answers included: ‘yes’, ‘no’, and ‘not sure’. I look at whether the 
exchange rate shocks had varying impacts between individuals with different 
answers to this question. To do this, I re-estimate equation (11) with interaction 
terms for intention to return and the exchange rate shocks. Table 5 below presents 
the results with different specifications that include or leave out certain controls, 
while always controlling for country of origin variables, including log GDP per 
capita which has been found to be important. Migrants who stated no intention to 
return are the reference group. 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
As expected, those who were unsure or stated their desire to return at the onset 
were more likely to return in wave 3 versus those who said they did not want to 
return. I cannot reject the null hypothesis that changing exchange rates had no 
effect on those who had no plans to return. On the other hand, favorable exchange 
rate shocks to migrants seem to have considerably delayed the return of those who 
have initially expressed desire to do so. Thus, exchange rate shocks seem to 
operate most at the level of changing the timing of return and less on the decision 
to return. But action at the extensive margin also exists, at least for the undecided. 
A favorable shock reduces the probability of return, albeit with a smaller 
magnitude, for migrants who were unsure of return at the beginning. 
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In regressions not shown, I further investigate differential effects of the 
exchange rate shocks by a migrant’s pre-crisis income level and country of origin 
GDP per capita. The coefficient estimates turn imprecise but generally show that 
increases in exchange rates accompany a reduced likelihood of return for all 
income categories and country of origin GDP per capita. 
C. Are Exchange Rate Shocks Merely a Proxy for Other Macroeconomic 
Variables? 
A concern about the previous regressions might be that the exchange rate 
shocks merely proxy for other macroeconomic shocks that occurred 
simultaneously in home countries during the financial crisis. In other words, since 
exchange rate changes were potentially correlated with variation in GDP per 
capita growth, unemployment, or prices, then it could be these variables 
influencing return and not the higher purchasing power resulting from the 
exchange rates. A direct test then would be to include these macroeconomic 
variables in estimating the main regression equations and observe if the estimated 
impact of the exchange rate changes. Table 6 displays the results of implementing 
such an analysis including GDP per capita growth and changes in unemployment 
in the home country between waves 2 and 3. Table 7 does the same for prices as 
computed from the CPI.12 I use only observations without missing values in all 
indicators to hold the sample constant across regressions. 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
 
12 
Because data on GDP per capita, unemployment, and CPI are only provided as yearly averages, I cannot compute the 
change in these variables that occurs exactly between interview dates for the migrants, in the same way I did for the 
exchange rate for which daily data was available. I settle for using a weighted measure in calculating the changes for these 
variables. For instance, if a migrant was interviewed on March 1995 for 2nd wave, I assign her country’s GDP per capita 
on that date as ¼ the value of the measure for that year’s plus ¾ the value of the previous year’s. I then do the same for the 
3rd wave interview. The resulting change in GDP per capita is going to be the log difference between the two waves. To be 
consistent, I recalculate the exchange rate shock measures in the same way for these sets of regressions. 
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The main result is insensitive to the inclusion of changes in GDP per capita or 
unemployment in Table 6. Column 1 replicates the main regression for the 
smaller sample. In column 2, higher GDP per capita growth in the home country 
appears to increase the likelihood that migrants return, but this effect disappears 
once the exchange rate shock is accounted for. In column 3, home country 
unemployment is unrelated to return. No matter how one includes other 
macroeconomic variables considered here as controls, the effect of the exchange 
rate shocks is robust. 
But the finding provides additional insight. In all regressions, exchange rate 
changes appear to be the most important determinant of return. Purchasing power 
and consumption appear to explain migrant return better than employment 
opportunities and prospects at home. While conventional wisdom might claim 
that migrants return because of a booming home country economy, it seems 
refuted by the above evidence. 
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
Table 7 shows how changes in the general price level in the home country are 
related to return. Column 1 is again a replication of the main result while column 
2 shows that changing prices demonstrates a similar effect on return as much as 
exchange rate shocks. Including both variables in the same regression in column 3 
keeps the point estimate for the effect of the exchange rate shock unchanged but 
precision is lost (it is now significant only at the 14% level). It reverses the sign 
for the effect of a price change and estimates it to be virtually zero. I interpret this 
as evidence that price changes serve merely as proxies of the exchange rate 
shocks.13 It appears that including price changes in the regression takes away 
 
13 
In fact, when I re-estimate this regression using a more precise measure of the exchange rate shock that occurred 
exactly between interview dates from wave 2 to 3, the coefficient on the exchange rate shock is statistically significant and 
the same from column 1 even when including the change in the CPI as a control. 
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useful variation in the exchange rate while not essentially affecting the return 
decision, making coefficient estimates imprecise. 
V. Robustness Checks 
The previous analysis relies on the assumption that exchange rate shocks 
during the Asian Financial Crisis were unexpected and exogenous. If such holds, 
then estimates above of 𝛽! are correctly interpreted as causal effects. I have 
controlled for as many possible confounding factors as the data permits. In this 
section, I provide additional robustness checks. 
Future exchange rate shocks may be systematically related to past migration 
trends so that the effect is merely capturing pre-existing trends. For instance, 
migrants exposed to appreciations in their home currency and actually returned 
could simply belong to countries in the past that have high propensities for return. 
I conduct two tests to address this concern. First, I run a placebo test where I 
regress future exchange rate shocks on past return migration. Future exchange rate 
shocks should not systematically predict return migration in the previous period. 
Second, I re-estimate equation (11) adding lagged values for previous exchange 
rate shocks. The tests verify that the exchange rate shocks during the Asian 
Financial crisis do not merely reflect past trends. 
Table 8 presents the falsification exercise. On Panel A, I regress the exchange 
rate shocks from the Asian financial crisis on the return indicator calculated from 
wave 1 to wave 2 of the survey. On Panel B, I regress the return variable from 
wave 2 to wave 3 on future exchange rate shocks calculated from wave 3 to 2 
years after. In both cases, I cannot reject the null that future exchange rate shocks 
predict past return. 
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
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Table 9 presents the results when I account for lagged exchange rate shock 
variables. These variables are always computed using 2-year changes in the 
exchange rate in order to conform to the exchange rate shock measured between 
wave 2 and 3, which are typically 2-year changes. Column 1 provides the baseline 
result from main table again for comparison. I restrict the sample to those with 
observations for lagged periods of the exchange rate shock to achieve consistency 
with the subsequent columns. Columns 2 and 3 include lagged variables one 
period before and two periods before as regressors. The point estimate for the 
coefficient of ΔlnERATE is unchanged in both. In column 4, I run a regression 
controlling for the long-term trend in country exchange rates, specified as the 
change in exchange rates for the past 10 years. In column 5, I control for a future 
exchange rate shock, measured as the change 2 years after the last year of 
interview. The conclusion from the baseline result remains unchanged. These 
regressions show that the effect of exchange rates does not merely reflect past 
trends; it is contemporaneous exchange rate shocks that influences return 
migration. In some way, this validates the focus on the period prior to and after 
the Asian Financial Crisis. It is during this window that shifts in the exchange rate 
appear to be unrelated to past trends, hence likely to be exogenous to migrants 
who were faced with them. 
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
A second concern is that outliers may be driving the results. Recall, certain 
countries had their currencies depreciate by as much as 100% during the period 
vis-à-vis the Australian dollar. Table 10 depicts what happens to the main 
regression when extreme observations are systematically dropped from the data. 
Column 1 again uses the full sample. Column 2 drops the migrants from the top 3 
countries with the most extreme currency depreciations (Bulgaria, Turkey, and 
 23 
Romania) and column 3 drops the top 5 (adding Nigeria and Venezuela). Column 
4 drops migrants who obtained above the 99th percentile of the exchange rate 
shock while columns 5 and 6 trim those above the 95th and 90th percentile 
respectively14. In all six cases, the effect of the exchange rate shock remains 
negative and significant with some evidence that trimming for extreme values 
even magnifies the effect. Outliers appear not to be driving the result. 
[Insert Table 10 Here] 
A third concern involves measurement error. The dependent variable, return, 
relies on information from a friend or relative of the migrant that she returned 
“overseas permanently.” There are conceivable ways in which this report might 
be inaccurate. “Overseas permanently” could reflect other reasons for attrition 
that the friend or relative was unaware of. It may also capture instances of 
migrants being overseas, only for a temporary trip or moving permanently to 
another country. Because return is used as a dependent variable, measurement 
error in which return is randomly misreported in a way unrelated to exchange rate 
shocks, is less of a concern since this merely introduces noise, and OLS 
coefficient estimates remain consistent. What would introduce bias are instances 
in which the error in measurement is systematically related to the exchange rate 
shocks. 
In the analysis, “overseas permanently” was interpreted to mean return home 
but could also mean that the migrant moved to another country permanently. To 
be a threat to identification though, it must follow that permanently migrating to 
other countries is somehow systematically determined by home country exchange 
rates. I cannot fully rule out this possibility yet it is improbable that this could 
yield the estimates that I find. For this explanation to fully account for the results, 
 
14 
The 99th percentile exchange rate shock is 1.2; the 95th percentile is 0.73; and the 90th percentile is 0.29. 
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for example, those who moved to another country should also have had larger 
appreciations in the currency of their place origin than those who did not move. 
This is quite unlikely on two counts. One, almost zero percent of respondents in 
wave 2 said that they “expect to immigrate to another country [aside from their 
former country] in the future.” The response to this question is tabulated in Table 
11. Even dropping these individuals in the analysis has no effect on the results. 
Second, the fact that the exchange rate shocks had the most effect on those who 
said they intend to return to their home country during the baseline makes it 
improbable that migrants were moving elsewhere. Thus, while “overseas 
permanently” perhaps captures movement to other countries as well, this 
measurement error most realistically introduces itself as random noise. The fact 
that the regressions are still able to measure the parameter of interest with 
statistical significance suggests this is not a huge concern. 
[Insert Table 11 Here] 
Another possibility is that measurement error, arising from other reasons of 
sample attrition listed in Table 3, is driving the results. It may, for instance, 
coincidentally happen that those who were noted as “unable to track” contain 
those who have left for home permanently, in a way that is also related to the 
exchange rate shocks. At the same time, migrants traveling home could be 
systematically mistaken as permanent returnees when they are in fact merely 
visiting.  
There is little evidence, however, that exchange rate shocks are related to any 
of these other reasons for attrition. Table 12 presents such an exercise where I 
regress each of these other reasons for attrition on the exchange rate shock. Only 
“out of scope” appears to be predicted by the exchange rate shocks with some 
statistical significance, and even then, the association is virtually zero. Further, if I 
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redo the analysis and expand the definition of return migration to include 
“overseas temporary” instead of just “overseas permanently,” the results are 
qualitatively unchanged. These results are excluded in this paper but are available 
upon request. 
[Insert Table 12 Here] 
VI. Conclusion 
The United Nations estimates that more than 232 million people (around 3% 
of the world’s population) are international migrants.15 Economists are just 
starting to understand how this growing group continues to relate to the countries 
where they are from. Remittances remain at the center of the conversation 
because of their magnitude. The developing world received $435 billion in 
remittances from international migrants in 2014 according to estimates by the 
World Bank.16 But return migration is another potentially important avenue 
countries stand to benefit from. It is, however, less understood. 
Migrant sending countries often lament the loss of their skilled nationals 
because many obtain legal permanent residence in rich countries. For this reason, 
return migration is often viewed positively and pursued by national governments. 
A returnee theoretically makes newly acquired skills, knowledge, and connections 
from working abroad available in the domestic economy; he invests his 
accumulated savings from overseas in the home country. But how might 
governments encourage return and maximize gains from such events? Effective 
policy depends in part on understanding precise motivations. Target earners 
benefit from the expansion of credit markets. For example, loans at subsidized 
 
15 http://esa.un.org/unmigration/documents/The_number_of_international_migrants.pdf (accessed Jan 31, 2015) 
16
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-
1288990760745/MigrationandDevelopmentBrief23.pdf (accessed Jan 31, 2015) 
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rates hasten return and facilitate the start-up of local businesses. On the other 
hand, such policies may be ineffective for life-cycle migrants. If return is indeed 
desired, then governments might do better by identifying consumption 
preferences and promoting them. To my knowledge though, the evaluation of 
these kinds of programs is lacking and requires additional research. 
In this paper, I examined the return motivations of legal permanent migrants 
in Australia. Such individuals are well educated and mostly have their entire 
families present with them abroad. Despite this, I find that they continue to be 
influenced by home country factors in their decision to return home. A 10% 
decline in home country exchange rate increases the likelihood of return in a two-
year period by 0.37 percentage points. This explains almost 10% of the return 
rate. The finding is comparable, yet smaller, to what Yang (2006) uncovers for 
temporary Filipino workers abroad. In that study, exchange rate shocks account 
for 20% of the return rate in a 12-month period. 
My results support a lifecycle explanation, where returnees are concerned 
mostly about consumption rather than investment or employment possibilities in 
their home country. I cast doubt that migrants, at least those similar to legal 
permanent migrants considered here, form a vast army of entrepreneurs who 
generate business activity when they return. They may not be interested in 
investment, as countries might hope. Nevertheless, their contribution may lie 
elsewhere and deserve further examination. 
Looking at subgroups, I find that those with predetermined expectations to re-
migrate in the future are most responsive to exchange rate shocks, followed by 
those undecided. Such evidence suggests that migrants time their return to 
favorable conditions. Unsurprisingly, those who stated no intention of re-
migration beforehand do not seem to react to exchange rate shocks at all. 
While return migration provides a peek into the economic lives of immigrants, 
further research is necessary for understanding what influences other behavior, 
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and how this continues or ceases to be tied to home country factors. Nekoei 
(2013) is a recent paper in this area and considers how the earnings and labor 
supply of US immigrants are affected in real time by home country exchange 
rates. Other fruitful areas to investigate are economic decisions such savings and 
expenditures that may be affected by home country shocks. The endeavor would 
ultimately generate a better picture of what motivates international migrants since 
return migration is unlikely to be decided in isolation to other equally important 
economic factors. 
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APPENDIX 
A. Comparative Statics for the Optimization of the Life-cycle Migrant 
The optimization problem can be reduced to:  
 max!!,!!,! 𝑡𝑢!(𝑐!)+ 1− 𝑡 𝑢!(𝑐!) such that 
(1)   𝑡𝐸𝑐! + 1− 𝑡 𝑐! = 𝑡𝐸𝑤! + 1− 𝑡 𝑤! 
 
The first order conditions of the Lagrangian are provided by the following 
equations: 
(2) 𝑢! 𝑐! − 𝑢! 𝑐! + 𝜆 𝐸𝑤! − 𝑤! + 𝑐! − 𝐸𝑐! = 0    
(3)  𝑢!! 𝑐! = 𝐸𝜆 
(4)  𝑢!! 𝑐! = 𝜆   
(5)  −𝑡 𝐸𝑤! − 𝑤! + 𝑐! − 𝐸𝑐! + 𝑐! − 𝑤! = 0     
 
Taking the total derivatives of (2) and (5) yields 
(6)  𝐸𝑤! − 𝑤! + 𝑐! − 𝐸𝑐! 𝑑𝜆 = −𝐸𝜆𝑑𝑤! + 𝜆𝑑𝑤! − 𝜆 𝑤! − 𝑐! 𝑑𝐸 
(7)  − 𝐸𝑤! − 𝑤! + 𝑐! − 𝐸𝑐! 𝑑𝑡 = −𝑡𝐸 𝜕𝑐𝑓𝜕𝜆 − 1− 𝑡 𝜕𝑐ℎ𝜕𝜆 𝑑𝜆 +                                                      𝑡𝐸𝑑𝑤! + 1− 𝑡 𝑑𝑤! + 𝑡 𝑤! − 𝑐! − 𝐸 𝜕𝑐𝑓𝜕𝐸 𝑑𝐸 
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Define 𝑎 = − 𝐸𝑤𝑓 − 𝑤𝑛 + 𝑐𝑛 − 𝐸𝑐𝑓  and 𝑏 = 𝑡𝐸 𝜕𝑐𝑓𝜕𝜆 + 1 − 𝑡 𝜕𝑐ℎ𝜕𝜆 . Then if we let 𝑑𝑤! = 𝑑𝑤! = 0 and substitute (6) into (7), the resulting equation is 
(8)  !"!" = !!"(!!!!!)!!   +   !"(!!!!!!!!!!!" )!!    
 𝑎 ≤ 0 because the migrant cannot consume more than her foreign wages abroad (𝑤! ≥ 𝑐!) and consumption at home must at least equal to wages and savings 
from abroad (𝑐! ≥ 𝑤!). At the same time, 𝑏 < 0 because it can be shown that 
both 𝜕𝑐𝑓𝜕𝜆  and 𝜕𝑐ℎ𝜕𝜆  are negative from the first order conditions (3) and (4). 
B. Comparative Statics for the Optimization of the Target earner 
The optimization problem can be reduced to: 
 max!!,!!,! 𝑡𝑢!(𝑐!)+ 1− 𝑡 𝑢!(𝑐!) such that 
(9)    𝑡𝑐! + 𝑆! = 𝑡𝑤!         
(10)  1− 𝑡 𝑐! = 1− 𝑡 𝑦 + 𝐸𝑆! − 𝐶   
(11) 𝐸𝑆! = 𝐶       
 
From (9), (10), and (11), it is easy to solve for optimal 𝑐! and 𝑐!. 
 𝑐! = 𝑤! −    !!" 
 𝑐! = 𝑦 
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Plugging these values into the objective function and taking the first order 
condition with respect to 𝑡 produces 
(12)  𝑢!! 𝑤! − !!" !!" + 𝑢! 𝑤! − !!" − 𝑢! 𝑦 = 0   
 
It follows that 
(13) 
!"!" = − !!  
 31 
REFERENCES 
Constant, Amelie, and Douglas S. Massey. 2002. "Return Migration by German 
Guestworkers: Neoclassical versus New Economic Theories." International 
Migration 40(4): 5-38. 
 
Centre d'Études Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII). “GeoDist 
Database.” http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm (accessed on 
July 5, 2013). 
 
Dustmann, Christian. 2003. "Return migration, wage differentials, and the optimal 
migration duration." European Economic Review 47(2): 353-369. 
 
Dustmann, Christian, and Yoram Weiss. 2007. "Return Migration: Theory and 
Empirical Evidence from the UK." British Journal of Industrial 
Relations 45(2): 236-256. 
 
Gibson, John, and David McKenzie. 2011. “The microeconomic determinants of 
emigration and return migration of the best and brightest: Evidence from the 
Pacific.” Journal of Development Economics 95(1): 18-29. 
 
Gunawardana, Pemasiri. 2006. "The Asian Currency Crisis and Australian 
Exports to East Asia." Economic Analysis and Policy 35(1-2): 73-90. 
 
Harris, John R., and Michael P. Todaro. 1970. "Migration, Unemployment and 
Development: A Two-Sector Analysis." The American Economic Review 60(1): 
126-142. 
 32 
 
Jasso, Guillermina, and Mark R. Rosenzweig. 1982.  "Estimating the Emigration 
Rates of Legal Immigrants Using Administrative and Survey Data: The 1971 
Cohort of Immigrants to the United States." Demography 19(3): 279-290. 
 
Kirdar, Murat G. 2013. "Source country characteristics and immigrants' optimal 
migration duration decision." IZA Journal of Migration 2(1): 1-21. 
 
Makin, Tony. 1999. “The Asian Currency Crisis and the Australian Economy,” 
Economic Policy and Analysis 29(1): 77-85. 
 
Mesnard, Alice. 2004. “Temporary Migration and Capital Market Imperfections.” 
Oxford Economic Papers 56(2): 242–262. 
 
Nekoei, Arash. 2013. “Immigrants’ Labor Supply and Exchange Rate Volatility.” 
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 5(4): 144-64. 
 
Park, Yung Chul. 1996. “East Asian Liberalization, Bubbles, and the Challenge 
from China.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1996(2): 357-371. 
 
Phillips, Janet, Michael Klapdor, and Joanne Simon-Davies. 2010. "Migration to 
Australia since federation: a guide to the statistics." Background Note, Australia 
Parliamentary Library. 
http://aphnew.aph.gov.au/binaries/library/pubs/bn/sp/migrationpopulation.pdf. 
 Piore, Michael J. 1979. Birds of Passage: Migrant Labor and Industrial Societies. 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
 33 
Radelet, Steven, and Jeffrey D. Sachs. 1998. "The East Asian Financial Crisis: 
Diagnosis, Remedies, Prospects." Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 28(1) 
1-74. 
 
Radelet, Steven, and Jeffrey Sachs. 1999. "What Have We Learned, So Far, From 
the Asian Financial Crisis?" CAER Discussion Paper No. 37. 
 
Sjaastad, Larry A. 1962. "The Costs and Returns of Human Migration." Journal 
of Political Economy 70(5): 80-93. 
 
Stark, Oded, Christian Helmenstein, and Yury Yegorov. 1997. "Migrants' 
Savings, Purchasing Power Parity, and the Optimal Duration of 
Migration." International Tax and Public Finance 4(3): 307-324. 
 
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (Population 
Division). 2013 “The Number of International Migrants Worldwide Reaches 
232 million.” 
http://esa.un.org/unmigration/documents/The_number_of_international_migra
nts.pdf (accessed Jan. 31, 2015) 
 
World Bank. “World Development Indicators.” http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/world-development-indicators (accessed July 5, 2013). 
 
World Bank, Development Prospects Group. 2014. “Migration and Remittances: 
Recent Developments and Outlook.” Migration and Development Brief. 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-
1288990760745/MigrationandDevelopmentBrief23.pdf (accessed Jan. 31, 
2015) 
 34 
 
Yang, Dean. 2006. "Why Do Migrants Return to Poor Countries? Evidence from 
Philippine Migrants' Responses to Exchange Rate Shocks." The Review of 
Economics and Statistics 88(4): 715-735. 
 
Queensland Treasury and Trade. Annual Economic Report, 1997-1998 
http://www.qgso.qld.gov.au/products/reports/annual-econ-report/annual-econ-
report-1997-98.pdf (accessed June 21, 2013)
 35 
 
FIGURE 1. FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES OF THE TOP 15 HOME COUNTRIES OF AUSTRALIAN IMMIGRANTS 
Notes: Historical exchange rate data are from Oanda Corporation. The exchange rates are expressed in foreign currency 
over Australian dollar (e.g. PHP/AUD) and are normalized to 1 in January 1996. 
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TABLE 1—DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE SAMPLE OF IMMIGRANTS 
Panel A: Immigrant Characteristics (N=3069) Mean St. Dev Min Max 
Prop. Male 0.57    
Age 32.72 8.59 15 60 
Married 0.72    
Highest Formal Qualification     
     Higher Degree 0.12    
     Post Graduate Diploma 0.06    
     Bachelor’s Degree 0.24    
     Technical/Professional Qualification 0.23    
     Trade 0.07    
     12 or more years of schooling 0.13    
     11 or fewer years of schooling 0.14    
Visa Classification     
     Preferential Family 0.45    
     Concessional Family 0.18    
     Business Skills & Employer Nomination 0.13    
     Independent 0.20    
     Humanitarian 0.05    
 
Panel B: Household Characteristics (N=3069) Mean St. Dev Min Max 
Household Size 3.53 1.85 1 14 
Number of Household Members in Home Country     
     0 0.60    
     1 0.27    
     2 or more 0.13    
AUD value of funds arrived with when first immigrated 26,332 94,439 0 1,100,000 
Average weekly incomea     
     None 0.09    
     $1 to $57 per week 0.05    
     $58 to $96 per week 0.03    
     $97 to $154 per week 0.10    
     $155 to $230 per week 0.09    
     $231 to $308 per week 0.07    
     $309 to $385 per week 0.07    
     $386 to $481 per week 0.10    
     $482 to $577 per week 0.10    
     $578 to $673 per week 0.07    
     $674 to $769 per week 0.05    
     $770 to $961 per week 0.07    
     $962 or more per week 0.11    
Household Sent Money Overseas to Relatives/Friends 0.19    
Place of Residence     
     New South Wales 0.43    
     Victoria 0.23    
     Queensland 0.11    
     South Australia 0.05    
     Western Australia 0.12    
     Other 0.06 
 
   
Panel C: Other Mean St. Dev Min Max 
Return Rate 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Exchange Rate Shock 0.10 0.29 -0.29 3.10 
GDP per capita (in USD, PPP) $13,977 $11,353 $472 $67,170 
 
a  To minimize missing observations, I construct average weekly income by taking the maximum between the 
average weekly income of the primary applicant and the spouse. This is an imperfect measure of household 
income although all the following regressions are robust to using average income only of the principal 
applicant. Alternate measures that the LSIA provides include total household income or total weekly income 
from all sources but these contain many missing observations. 
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TABLE 2—THE TOP 15 SOURCE COUNTRIES WITH MEAN EXCHANGE RATE CHANGES EXPERIENCED 
Origin country N 
percent  
of sample 
percent 
cumulative 
mean exchange rate 
change 
England 281 9.16 9.16 -0.08 
Hong Kong 187 6.09 15.25 -0.05 
China (excluding Taiwan) 153 4.99 20.23 -0.07 
India 145 4.72 24.94 0.08 
Philippines 126 4.11 29.06 0.14 
South Africa 121 3.94 33.01 0.18 
United States of America 105 3.42 36.43 -0.04 
Japan 78 2.54 38.97 0.16 
Lebanon 78 2.54 41.51 -0.10 
Malaysia 74 2.41 43.92 0.14 
South Korea 73 2.38 46.30 0.24 
Indonesia 72 2.35 48.65 0.72 
Turkey 72 2.35 53.27 1.12 
Germany 70 2.28 55.33 0.08 
Thailand 63 2.05 57.25 0.20 
Other 1371 44.67 100 0.08 
Total 3069 100 100 0.10 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3—REASONS FOR SAMPLE ATTRITION 
Reason Description 
Unable to Track Address information not current or inadequate. Migrant was not contacted and current location unknown 
Refused Migrant refused interview. 
Overseas Temporarily Information given that migrant has left Australia for the scheduled interview period, but intends to return to Australia 
Overseas Permanently Information given that migrant has left Australia and does not intend to return. 
Out of area Migrant settled in area too distant from capital city to be economically viable to interview. 
Other Migrant too sick to interview, deceased, other reasons. 
 
 
 
 38 
TABLE 4— THE EFFECT OF EXCHANGE RATE SHOCKS ON PERMANENT RETURN MIGRATION 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
ΔlnERATE -0.0512*** -0.0380*** -0.0366*** -0.0389*** -0.0373*** 
 (0.0128) (0.00948) (0.0109) (0.00988) (0.0104) 
      
ln(GDP per capita of origin country)  0.0172*** 0.0161*** 0.0139*** 0.0155*** 
  (0.00321) (0.00340) (0.00396) (0.00441) 
      
Other Country of Origin controls N N Y Y Y 
Household controls N N N Y Y 
Individual Migrant controls N N N N Y 
N 3069 3069 3069 3069 3069 
R2 0.007 0.016 0.016 0.027 0.028 
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating that the individual is reported to be “overseas 
permanently” (assumed here to have returned to country of origin). Exchange rates are in terms of foreign 
currency per Australian dollar. Country of origin controls include indicators for common language and colonial 
relationship with Australia, the log distance from Australia, and an indicator for whether the country was one of 
the countries hardest hit by the Asian Financial Crisis. Household and immigrant controls include age, sex, 
highest educational attainment, household size, marital status, type of visa upon admission, state of residence, 
average weekly income and Australian dollar value of funds arrived with when first immigrated. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country of origin level 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE 5— THE EFFECTS OF EXCHANGE RATE SHOCKS BY INTENTION OF RETURN 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Intend to Return=NOT SURE 0.0555*** 0.0502*** 0.0501*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0106) (0.0103) 
    
Intend to Return=YES 0.178*** 0.172*** 0.169*** 
 (0.0433) (0.0429) (0.0425) 
    
ΔlnERATE -0.0119 -0.0151 -0.0130 
 (0.0106) (0.00942) (0.0157) 
    
(ΔlnERATE)*(Intend to Return=NOT SURE) -0.0625*** -0.0551*** -0.0568*** 
 (0.0172) (0.0175) (0.0184) 
    
(ΔlnERATE)*(Intend to Return=YES) -0.233*** -0.225*** -0.224*** 
 (0.0757) (0.0747) (0.0748) 
    
Country of Origin controls Y Y Y 
Household controls N Y Y 
Individual Migrant controls N N Y 
N 3069 3069 3069 
R2 0.050 0.057 0.057 
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating that the individual is reported to be “overseas 
permanently” (assumed here to have returned to country of origin). Intend to Return is an indicator variable that 
captures the immigrant’s response to the question in wave 2, “Do you intend to return to your home country?” 
Possible answers were: ‘yes’, ‘no’, and ‘not sure.’ Exchange rates are in terms of foreign currency per 
Australian dollar. Country of origin controls include indicators for common language and colonial relationship 
with Australia, the log distance from Australia, and an indicator for whether the country was one of the 
countries hardest hit by the Asian Financial Crisis. Household and immigrant controls include age, sex, highest 
educational attainment, household size, marital status, type of visa upon admission, state of residence, average 
weekly income and Australian dollar value of funds arrived with when first immigrated. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country of origin level 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE 6— ARE THE EXCHANGE RATE SHOCKS MERELY CAPTURING THE EFFECT OF GDP PER CAPITA GROWTH AND 
CHANGES IN UNEMPLOYMENT IN HOME COUNTRIES? 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
ΔlnERATE -0.0483***   -0.0440*** -0.0469*** -0.0438*** 
 (0.0124)   (0.0114) (0.0120) (0.0115) 
       
ΔlnGDPPCAPITA  0.175*  0.0928  0.0838 
  (0.0995)  (0.0966)  (0.0896) 
       
ΔUNEMPLOYMENT   -0.0024  -0.0013 -0.0005 
   (0.0025)  (0.0024) (0.0024) 
       
Country of Origin controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Household controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Individual Migrant controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 2480 2480 2480 2480 2480 2480 
R2 0.037 0.036 0.032 0.037 0.033 0.033 
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating that the individual is reported to be “overseas 
permanently” (assumed here to have returned to country of origin). Exchange rates are in terms of foreign 
currency per Australian dollar. Country of origin controls include indicators for common language and colonial 
relationship with Australia, the log distance from Australia, and an indicator for whether the country was one of 
the countries hardest hit by the Asian Financial Crisis. Household and immigrant controls include age, sex, 
education level, household size, marital status, type of visa upon admission, state of residence, average weekly 
income in the earlier wave and Australian dollar value of funds arrived with when first immigrated 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country of origin level 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE 7— ARE THE EXCHANGE RATE SHOCKS MERELY CAPTURING THE EFFECT OF CHANGES IN THE GENERAL 
PRICE LEVEL IN HOME COUNTRIES? 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
ΔlnERATE -0.0393***  -0.0418 
 (0.0103)  (0.0281) 
    
ΔlnCPI  -0.0361*** 0.00312 
  (0.0116) (0.0312) 
    
Country of Origin controls Y Y Y 
Household controls Y Y Y 
Individual Migrant controls Y Y Y 
N 3080 3080 3080 
R2 0.032 0.031 0.031 
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating that the individual is reported to be “overseas 
permanently” (assumed here to have returned to country of origin). Exchange rates are in terms of foreign 
currency per Australian dollar. Country of origin controls include indicators for common language and colonial 
relationship with Australia, the log distance from Australia, and an indicator for whether the country was one of 
the countries hardest hit by the Asian Financial Crisis. Household and immigrant controls include age, sex, 
education level, household size, marital status, type of visa upon admission, state of residence, average weekly 
income in the earlier wave and Australian dollar value of funds arrived with when first immigrated 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country of origin level 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE 8— THE EFFECT OF FUTURE EXCHANGE RATE SHOCKS ON PERMANENT RETURN MIGRATION IN THE PRIOR 
PERIOD 
Panel A Return from wave 1 – wave 2 Panel B 
Return from 
wave 2 – wave 3 
    
ΔlnERATEwave2 –wave3 -0.0057 ΔlnERATEwave3 – 2yrs after -0.0139 
 (0.0081)  (0.0128) 
    
Country of Origin controls Y Country of Origin controls Y 
Household controls Y Household controls Y 
Individual Migrant Controls Y Individual Migrant controls Y 
N 3535 N 3069 
R2 0.005 R2 0.025 
Notes; For panel A, the dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating that the individual is reported to be 
“overseas permanently” for wave 2 (assumed here to have returned to country of origin). The exchange rate 
change is the change in the exchange rate from wave 2 to wave 3 of the survey. For panel B, the dependent 
variable is a dummy variable indicating that the individual is reported to be “overseas permanently” for wave 3 
(assumed here to have returned to country of origin). The exchange rate change is the change in the exchange 
rate from wave 3 to two years after the survey. Country of origin controls include indicators for common 
language and colonial relationship with Australia, the log distance from Australia, and an indicator for whether 
the country was one of the countries hardest hit by the Asian Financial Crisis. Household and immigrant 
controls include age, sex, highest educational attainment, household size, marital status, type of visa upon 
admission, state of residence, average weekly income and Australian dollar value of funds arrived with when 
first immigrated. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country of origin level 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE 9— ARE THE EFFECTS OF THE EXCHANGE RATE SHOCKS CONTEMPORANEOUS? 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
ΔlnERATE -0.0554* -0.0557* -0.0554* -0.0565* -0.0543* 
 (0.0280) (0.0284) (0.0285) (0.0284) (0.0292) 
      
ΔlnERATElag1  0.0070 0.0063   
  (0.0494) (0.0499)   
ΔlnERATElag2   0.0057   
   (0.0239)   
ΔlnERATElag10yr    0.0029  
    (0.0031)  
ΔlnERATEfuture     0.0104 
     (0.0176) 
      
Country of Origin controls Y Y Y Y Y 
Household controls Y Y Y Y Y 
Individual Migrant controls Y Y Y Y Y 
N 2596 2596 2596 2596 2596 
R2 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating that the individual is reported to be “overseas 
permanently” (assumed here to have returned to country of origin). Exchange rates are in terms of foreign 
currency per Australian dollar. Country of origin controls include indicators for common language and colonial 
relationship with Australia, the log distance from Australia, and an indicator for whether the country was one of 
the countries hardest hit by the Asian Financial Crisis. Household and immigrant controls include age, sex, 
highest educational attainment, household size, marital status, type of visa upon admission, state of residence, 
average weekly income and Australian dollar value of funds arrived with when first immigrated. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country of origin level 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE 10— THE EFFECT OF EXCHANGE RATE SHOCKS ON PERMANENT RETURN MIGRATION FOR THE TRIMMED 
SAMPLE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Full sample 
w/o top 3 
extreme 
w/o top 5 
extreme 
trim 99th 
percentile 
trim 95th 
percentile 
trim 90th 
percentile 
       
ΔlnERATE -0.0373*** -0.0513** -0.0518** -0.0437*** -0.0842*** -0.104** 
 (0.0104) (0.0207) (0.0231) (0.0130) (0.0272) (0.0414) 
       
       
Country of Origin controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Household controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Individual Migrant controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 3069 2963 2948 3036 2915 2768 
R2 0.028 0.027 0.027 0.028 0.028 0.027 
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating that the individual is reported to be “overseas 
permanently” (assumed here to have returned to country of origin). Exchange rates are in terms of foreign 
currency per Australian dollar. Country of origin controls include indicators for common language and colonial 
relationship with Australia, the log distance from Australia, and an indicator for whether the country was one of 
the countries hardest hit by the Asian Financial Crisis. Household and immigrant controls include age, sex, 
education level, household size, marital status, type of visa upon admission, state of residence, average weekly 
income in the earlier wave and Australian dollar value of funds arrived with when first immigrated 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country of origin level 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 11— EXPECT TO EMIGRATE TO ANOTHER COUNTRY? 
 Freq. Percent 
Yes 28 0.91 
No 2699 87.94 
Not Sure 213 6.94 
[Expect to immigrate to former country] 129 4.20 
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TABLE 12— THE CORRELATION BETWEEN THE ATTRITION VARIABLE AND THE EXCHANGE RATE SHOCKS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Unable to Track Refused 
Overseas 
Temporarily 
Out of 
Scope Deceased Other 
       
ΔlnERATE 0.0085 0.0054 -0.0117 0.0078* -0.0009 0.0131 
 (0.0131) (0.0113) (0.0170) (0.0047) (0.0006) (0.0089) 
       
Country of Origin controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Household controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Individual Migrant 
controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 3069 3069 3069 3069 3069 3069 
R2 0.022 0.002 0.013 0.000 0.007 0.007 
Notes: Exchange rates are in terms of foreign currency per Australian dollar. Country of origin controls include 
indicators for common language and colonial relationship with Australia, the log distance from Australia, and 
an indicator for whether the country was one of the countries hardest hit by the Asian Financial Crisis. 
Household and immigrant controls include age, sex, education level, household size, marital status, type of visa 
upon admission, state of residence, average weekly income in the earlier wave and Australian dollar value of 
funds arrived with when first immigrated. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country of origin level 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
